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Abstract
While crowdsourcing has become increasingly popular
among organizations, it also has become increasingly
susceptible to unethical and malicious activities. This
paper discusses recent examples of disruptive and
deceptive efforts on crowdsourcing sites, which
impacted the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of the crowdsourcing efforts’ service, stakeholders,
and data. From these examples, we derive an
organizing framework of risk types associated with
disruption and deception in crowdsourcing based on
commonalities among incidents. The framework
includes prank activities, the intentional placement of
false information, hacking attempts, DDoS attacks,
botnet attacks, privacy violation attempts, and data
breaches. Finally, we discuss example controls that
can assist in identifying and mitigating disruption and
deception risks in crowdsourcing.

1. Introduction
Organizations can use crowdsourcing to take “a
function once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of
people in the form of an open call” [27]. Crowdsourcing has emerged as a viable alternative business
model that focuses on problem solving and production
provided by the distributed network of individuals [8].
It potentially has many benefits [26][7][12][6]: It can
be more cost-effective than having traditional
employees perform certain tasks.
It enables
organizations to get access to a wide and varied
collection of opinions and ideas, which can reduce bias
in decision-making. It allows organizations and
governments to directly engage with customers and
citizen. Although crowdsourcing is still evolving as an
organizational and societal phenomenon, its potential
demonstrated is by data from the crowdsourcing
market: 15 major crowd service providers almost
tripled their revenues from US$140.80Min 2009 to
US$375.70M in 2011 and the global enterprise
crowdsourcing market growth rate reported 75%
growth in 2011 compared to 53% in 2010 [33].
Yet, several challenges threaten the usefulness of
crowdsourcing as a reliable organizational problem
solving approach. For example, there are challenges
concerning the ownership of crowdsourced products or
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the perceived lack of quality standards related to
crowdsourced goods or services [31][17]. Moreover,
recently crowdsourcing sites have emerged with the
intention of causing harm online. A rapid increase in
malicious crowdsourcing service sites (also known as
crowdturfing sites) has been observed in countries like
China, the US, and India [50]. Such sites recruit
individuals that for a small payment post false negative
restaurant reviews, write biased political comments, or
post false advertising [51]. There are also examples of
legitimate initiatives that have been attacked by
individuals seeking to achieve profits from exploiting
the crowd-sourcing ventures: In 2016 users posted
false reports of blocked road traffic in their
neighborhoods on a crowdsourced app Waze to deflect
some of the traffic flow from the places where their
lived [24].
As crowdsourcing is increasingly becoming one of
the ways in which organizations execute projects and
support decision-making, disruptive and deceptive use
of and responses to crowdsourcing initiatives need to
be better understood and mitigated. It is unclear what
harm might be caused to individuals and organizations
by potential deception in crowdsourcing. For example,
scholars are also unsure how disruptive the effects of
crowdsourcing pranks and deceptions are on
organizations. It is also unclear what are the physical
or emotional effects of deceptive or violated
crowdsourcing efforts on its contributors or
beneficiaries.
Both crowdsourcers and crowdsourcing providers
must be aware of existing threats and threats that may
develop in the future. Currently, the biggest challenge
that crowdsourcing providers and consumers faces
concerns the number of crowd participants whose
malicious behavior is difficult to detect and control
[12]. Thus, the primary motivation for this study is to
understand intentional disruptive and deceptive
behavior in crowdsourcing contexts. Our main
objective is to identify emerging risks that are related
to crowdsourcing deception. We discuss recent
examples where crowdsourcing websites were attacked
or abused by malicious activities. Finally, we propose
an organizing framework of risks that result from these
security violations and deception cases.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we
discuss previous research on disruption and deception
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in crowdsourcing environments. Next, we present our
study’s method. We then present the categorization of
the identified disruption and deception incidents and
analyze the identified cases using defined risk pattern
clusters according to the CIA triad. We discuss
potential controls ways to mitigate the identified
issues. Finally, we discuss the implications of the
study, its limitations, and directions for future research.

2. Background
Past research on cyber threats and deception in
crowdsourcing has focused on different issues. For
example, Dwarakanath et al. [14] focused on crowd
trustworthiness in crowdsourced software development
initiatives. They proposed a taxonomy of
trustworthiness and existing methods to build trust in a
crowd. They showed that macro-tasks that require
specific skills are related to a high level of
untrustworthiness. They also found that workers’ poor
reputation had a strong impact on trustworthiness.
Other findings showed little correlation between
monetary benefits and trustworthiness.
Stefanovich et al. [43] analyzed the ability of
crowdsourcing systems to cope with attacks. Based on
the data collected from DARPA’s Shredder Challenge,
the researchers identified attack mechanisms and
analyzed how users recover from such attacks. They
argued that while participants can recover from errors
in the long term, the attacks still affected participants:
after being attacked, participants develop a notion of
not being able to influence malicious behavior. It thus
appears that victims of malicious behavior often suffer
from motivational challenges to get involved in tasks.
Consequently, their task efficiency tends to drop as
well. Lasecki et al. [31] found similar motivational
challenges as a result of crowdsourcing threats: they
found that the more malicious tasks appear in a
crowdsourcing environment, the less willing users are
to participate in such tasks. Their study further showed
that even simple tasks are subject to online
manipulation and can be a target for information
distraction.
Harris [22] raised the issue of ethics in
crowdsourcing design and analyzed the examples of
crowdsourcing initiatives that intentionally would not
conform to ethical standards. In his study, he examined
how crowdsourcing contributes to population of
unethical behaviors and activities such as posting fake
online reviews. In the same online reviewing context,
Fayazi et al. [16] investigated how to uncover
crowdsourced manipulation. The researchers created a
sampling method to track down items, which received
manipulated online reviews. Their method also aims at
identifying and removing users who post false reviews
from affected crowdsourcing platforms. Similarly,

Chen et al. [10] described crowdsourcing tasks where
the provision of new information (exploration) is often
distorted and exploited, because the verification part of
a crowdsourced task is neglected. The researchers built
an agent-based model that helped them balance
exploitation and exploration in crowdsourced search
tasks where time plays a critical role.
Crowdsourcing users can also create fake identities
(Sybils), which, when multiplied, can be used to boost
the perpetrators’ reputation. Cheng et al. [11] presented
a frame-work to assess robustness of reputation
mechanism to Sybils. Like flagging fake identities,
researchers have also focused on flagging fake or
inappropriate content. Kayes et al. [29] built a
classifier that detects abusive users of communitybased question/answering platforms. Their findings
show that flagging suspicious content by the users
works effectively as a crowdsourced monitoring
function. Moreover, the researchers found that flagged
users received more attention but often were not
perceived as toxic to the community. On the contrary,
flagged users who posted questions received a higher
than average level of response compared to questions
posted by ordinary users.
Finally, Wolfson et al. [53] analyzed data securityrelated areas, where crowdsourcing and the law are
likely to intersect in the near future. They discuss
possible challenges related to the deployment of
crowdsourcing and claims that crowdsourcing misuse
is highly tied to issues with data security.
As can be seen, research on cyber threats and
deception in crowdsourcing is fragmented. Apart from
the separate studies on cyber and deception threats to
crowdsourcing discussed above, we were unable to
identify any study exploring the scope of the problem
or addressing the problem from a holistic perspective
by taking a full range of threats into consideration. The
next section describes our research method to collect
and analyze practical examples of cyber threats and
deception in crowdsourcing in order to develop a holistic framework of the different types of such threats.

3. Method
The development of a structured overview of cyber
threats and deception in crowdsourcing took place in
three steps. Each step is detailed below.

3.1 Crowdsourcing organizing framework
We first conceptualized a crowdsourcing effort in
terms of the relevant elements that can be
distinguished. The purpose of this conceptualization is
to collect relevant information about examples of
malicious
crowdsourcing
efforts.
Thus,
our
conceptualization is an example of a Theory for
Analyzing, which is “used to classify specific
Page 3967

dimensions or characteristics… by summarizing the
commonalities found in discrete observations… when
nothing or very little is known about the phenomenon
in question” [21]. Our conceptualization is based on
past definitions of crowdsourcing (e.g. [27]), previous
models (e.g. [38]), and past research (e.g. [14]).
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Figure 1. Conceptualization of a
crowdsourcing effort.
Our conceptual model of a crowdsourcing effort
consists of the following elements (Figure 1):
• Crowdsourcing Task: The work assignment for
which contributions are solicited. Crowdsourcing
tasks are also referred to as problems or challenges.
We captured information that would characterize the
task that was at the center of a deceptive
crowdsourcing incident.
• Crowd: The individuals (crowd workers) who
perform the task. In the deceptive crowdsourcing
context, crowd-related issues concern malicious
human behavior as well as the identification of
mechanisms that might initiate such behavior.
• Crowdsourcing Platform: Connects the crowd and
problem owner. When capturing crowdsourcing deception examples, we focus on risks and vulnerabilities related to the platform or its management.
• Problem Owner: Defines a task, posts it on a
platform, and provides data and tools for task
completion. For our analysis, we focus on
information related to the problem-owner’s context
concerning risks that were initiated by problem
owners or caused by their negligence.
• Governance: The policies, reward structures, and
moderation of the crowdsourcing effort. We
collected information on the governance mechanisms
used in the incidents and related vulnerabilities, e.g.
lack of quality control.
• Crowd Contributions: Outputs from crowd members
when they have completed their tasks. We captured
information regarding potentially disruptive or
deceptive input, e.g. intentionally false information,
and its’ effects on the crowdsourcing results.

3.2 Identification of deceptive crowdsourcing
incidents
Next, we conducted a search for examples of deceptive
crowdsourcing incidents. We scoped our search as
follows. First, we focused on examples from academic
or practice publications, including web publications,
from the last 10 years. As crowdsourcing is a relatively
young phenomenon, we did not expect to find
examples that go back earlier than 2007. Second, we
focused only on legitimate (legal) crowdsourcing
efforts that had become target or victim of malicious
intent. During our search, we found examples of a
distinct type of malicious crowdsourcing called
“crowdturfing” [50][51], where the effort is
purposefully organized to cause harm. Crowdturfing
problem owners reward a crowd to perform malicious
activities, e.g. putting negative comments on
competitors’ products’ websites. Yet, our focus is on
crowdsourcing efforts that fall victim of malicious
activities, such as cybersecurity breaches or deception.
To find examples of incidents, we performed a wide
search using academic (Google Scholar, ABI/INFORM
Global) and general (Google) online search engines. We
determined search terms in two steps: We first identified
search terms that we felt would best reflect our
phenomenon of interest. Then, from the relevant
publications we found, we identified additional synonyms
and other content search terms. We performed a final
search with the additional terms to find further
publications. Our final search terms list includes terms
such as “crowdsourcing deception”, “crowdsourcing
threats”,
“cybersecurity
crowd-sourcing”,
“open
innovation challenges”, “online labor market challenges”,
“public participation gone bad”, “online contest gone
bad”, “hacking of crowdsourcing webpages”,
“crowdsourcing controversy”, and combi-nations of
constituent terms. For each example that we identified, we
collected available information per the elements of our
conceptual model. As our objective was not to create a
comprehensive library of every reported incident, we did
not capture information on incidents that could be
considered identical in nature as others that we recorded
already. For example, descriptions of malicious prank
attempts on crowdsourcing websites are relatively
common so we only included a few in our set of incidents.

3.3 Extracting deceptive crowdsourcing types
For the final step we looked for commonalities among
the different incidents that we recorded to identify
distinct types of cyber threats to crowdsourcing. Next,
we used the Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability
(CIA) triad to sort the threat types in terms of what part
of the triad was at risk. We used the CIA triad as this
one of the most popular cybersecurity frameworks.
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Next, we defined specific risks involved in each type
of crowdsourcing threat and for outlining examples of
controls that can assist in preventing the risk or
mitigating the risk’s impact when it materializes.

4. Results
4.1 Crowdsourcing incidents
Our search of publications and online sources yielded a
variety of real-case incidents that are detailed in
Appendix A. We included 18 incidents in this
overview; similar incidents were left out due to page
limitations. For each incident we captured relevant
information from the publication or online source
according to the elements of our conceptual model.
The overview of the incidents shows that half of the
Confidentiality-related incidents were related to
privacy violations caused by the placement of sensitive
data online. All incidents related to Integrity breaches
were caused by the placement of false information
intending to gain profit, willingness to make other
participants lose, or disruption of crowdsourcing
initiative using prank information. The only malicious
incident type identified as an Availability-issue was
related to DDoS attacks, which intend to disrupt the
secure flow of information. Table 1 gives an overview.
We realize that the identified collection of
malicious and deceptive activities is unlikely to be
exhaustive. Companies that fell victim to deceptive
crowdsourcing efforts may be reluctant to publicly
share information about the experience. Still, the
collected incidents show an interesting pattern. We
observe that all cases were either related to the
placement of false information, sharing of sensitive
information, the disruption of secure information flow
or intentional deceptive action aimed at undermining
crowdsourcing initiatives. User deception by
provisioning of false information, disrupting the
content of correct information or denying access to
correct information appeared to be most common.

4.2 Confidentiality risks and controls
A further analysis of the incidents that are related to
confidentiality resulted in two types of malicious
crowdsourcing risks. The first concerns the hacking of
crowdsourcing sites. Crowdsourcing sites appear to get
hacked for the same reasons as other online services,
e.g., theft of sensitive data such as user names, email
addresses, and shipping addresses. For example,
criminals hacked Kickstarter to collect sensitive data
including passwords, phone numbers, email addresses,
and credit card details. The crowdfunding site Patreon
was hacked for user names and their addresses. When
considering the risks related to hacking crowdsourcing

sites, there are at least two consequences to the
disclosure of sensitive and private data. First, there
may be financial implications due to penalties that the
site owner might need to pay if the information gets
hacked. Second, there will be reputational damage, as
the hack will cause a loss of trust among existing and
future crowd members and problem owners. Controls
for this risk should aim to prevent successful hacking
attempts and, if a hack has taken place, limit its impact.
To mitigate hacking-related risks, the crowdsourcing
field should focus on technological measures (e.g.
regular platform patching, encryption of information
stored on website servers), behavioral measures (e.g.
implement strong password policies), and governance
measures (e.g. recovery plans, communication plans,
and limited collection of personal information).
The second type of Confidentiality risks is related
to privacy violations through voluntary sharing of
personal data. For example, Netflix released anonymized user records as part of its “Netflix Prize” Contest.
The PatientsLikeMe website users’ personal data on
taken medications and illness symptoms was scraped
by Nielsen and used for further business analysis. Both
incidents refer to the disclosure of sensitive data, which
can cause risks such as the violation of privacy of
crowd members, harm the site’s reputation, and result
in penalties imposed on website owners.
Examples of controls to prevent privacy violation
cases include the verification of information that is
sourced from non-official channels, regular education
of users on ways to protect sensitive data or enabling
corrective forms on the site so that users who spot
inappropriate data can flag it accordingly.

4.3 Integrity risks and controls
Our analysis of the integrity-related incidents revealed
four distinct types. The first type concerns the
intentional placement of false information with the goal
to increase the perpetrator’s gains and expose victims to
potential harm. In this situation, victims are often
unaware that they have been wronged. For example,
when someone enters false information on a traffic site
to move traffic away from their neighborhood, others’
trips may be rerouted causing unnecessary delays that
they are unaware of. Risks related to this type include
the crowdsourcing site being perceived unreliable over
time causing users to cease contributing to it. Controls
should primarily focus on preventing false information
being submitted and minimizing the consequence of
false information. Examples of such controls include the
analysis of recurring patterns for data input, analysis of
outliers or inconsistent data, cross referencing of entered
information with other data sources, and policies focus
on swift removal of user profiles who were caught
entering false information.
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Table 1 Identified risks types and controls objectives
Type
C1. Hacking
crowdsourcing site
(e.g., theft of private
information)
C2. Privacy violation

I1. Placement of false
information (e.g.,
rerouting of the traffic)
– perpetrator gains,
victim is exposed to
potential harm or might
not be aware that has
been victimized

Risk description
Loss of trust among stakeholders;
financial loss; reputational loss
impacting future investors decisions;
penalties if the information gets
stolen
Legal privacy violation due to
sharing of unverified or sensitive
information between the crowd
members; reputational loss;
regulatory or legal penalties
Website becomes unreliable, users
might not be willing to use the
service any more

I2. Placement of false
information to make
others lose or to cause
harm to others (e.g.,
competitions)

Website becomes unreliable, users
might not be willing to use the
service anymore;
Financial losses are likely to follow

I3. Botnet attack to
bring false results, e.g.
placement of false
traffic information
I4. Prank activity in
crowdsourcing contests

Website becomes unreliable, users
might not be willing to use the
service anymore; Financial losses
are likely to follow
The crowd that places wrong or
erroneous information ‘for fun’ puts
the organizer at risk of needing to
retract the contest. Financial losses
and damage of the organizer’s
credibility are likely to occur
DDoS attacks negatively impact
availability and performance of
crowdsourcing sites and can lead to
negative financial consequences as
well as destroy the image of the site

A1. Botnet attack
(DDoS)

Control objective
Reduction of successful
hacking attempts.
Reduction of hacking
impact/recovery planning
effort
Prevention of privacy
violation cases

Control examples
Regular patching of platform software and user applications that support the
crowdsourced service; strong password policy; continuous education of all
stakeholders on avoiding hacker attacks; recovery plans/ communication plans,
regularly reviewed; encryption of private information; reduce amount of PII
data collected
Verification of information sourced from non-official channels; prevention of
sensitive data sharing; providing forms to report inappropriate data; regular user
education on sensitive data protection

Preventing the spread of
false information;
Minimization of the
damage brought by false
information
Keeping the data consistent
and accurate – in case the
issues are found the data is
rectified
Preventing the input and/or
the dissemination of false
information; minimization
of disinformation efforts;
keeping the data consistent
and accurate
Keeping the data consistent
and accurate

Analysis of recurring patterns for data input; analysis of outliers/ inconsistent
data; identification of instances where the entry of false data is possible;
monitoring and assessment of crowd behavior; flagging type of controls –
people can report false information; cross referencing of entered information
with other data sources, e.g., traffic reports; introduction of policies that allow
the removal of users who were caught with entering false data; introduction of
delay between collecting the information and posting it on the website; limiting
the number of entries from a single user/ single area and reviewing the
information that comes from the same source
Monitoring and assessment of crowd behavior; monitoring of inconsistencies in
information inputs; online monitoring – statistical sampling techniques;
allowing participants to raise concerns in case they spot problems on a
webpage; introduction of immediate action that follows false information entry,
e.g., perpetrators are banned and their profiles are removed from the system;
verification of identity before users post information or take part in competition
Continuous automated data checks, recognition of suspicious patterns;
implementation of technological solutions that identify or prevent automatic
scripting; use of analytics to recognize patterns, to analyze where the site is
approached from and to monitor Internet traffic
Monitoring and assessing crowd behavior; verification of user’s identity before
they can post information on a website or take part in an online competition;
remove false information; banning people; enabling of possibility to flag
suspicious content by users

Keeping the data consistent
and accurate

Prevention of DDoS
attacks; early detection of
DDoS attacks; reduction of
impact of DDoS attacks

Reactive: Event monitoring of hosting infrastructure, rerouting of unwanted
internet traffic, continuous automated data checks, recognition of suspicious
network flow patterns; Proactive: installation of firewalls, monitoring the
history of network flows, deployment of multiple Internet Service Providers,
recovery plan in place in case the attacks cannot be prevented
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The second type concerns the placement of false information to make other crowd members lose or to cause
harm. This type occurred several times at DARPA
crowdsourced competitions. The competition results
were affected as perpetrators entered false information
to frustrate other competitors’ work on the
crowdsourced tasks. The key risk related to such action
concerns crowdsourcing efforts becoming unreliable so
that users become reluctant to use the service. Controls
to mitigate this risk focus on preventing the
dissemination of false information, minimizing
disinformation efforts, and maintaining consistency
and accuracy of information that has already been
uploaded. Control activities include monitoring and
assessing crowd behavior, monitoring for inconsistencies in contributions, and assessing selected contributions using statistical sampling techniques. Also,
controls could be considered that allow crowd
members to raise concerns when they spot problems.
Individuals making false contributions should be
banned immediately and their profiles and contributions should be removed from the system. Another
control concerns identity verification before users are
allowed to post information or enter in a competition.
The third type concerns the placement of false
information on a crowdsourcing site through botnet
attacks. This type is different from the previous two
because of the technological nature of this type of
threat. Waze was hit by a botnet attack when students
created false automated profiles to influence traffic
information and reroute the traffic. The main risk
related to malicious automated behavior is that
websites become unreliable so that users no longer use
the services anymore. Possible controls to mitigate
botnet attacks include analytics to recognize patterns in
registration and data input and technological solutions
that identify or prevent automatic scripting.
The last Integrity-type concerns prank activities.
Crowd members may contribute wrong, erroneous, or
even objectionable information “for fun”. This may
force the problem owner to retract the contest.
Consequently, financial losses and damages to the
organizer’s credibility are likely to occur. The
following controls can assist in keeping data consistent
and accurate: monitoring and assessment of crowd
behavior, user identity verification before allowing
participation in the contest or making contributions,
swift removal of false information, and enabling users
to flag suspicious content by other users.

4.4 Availability risks and controls
The only availability type that emerged from our
collection of incidents concerns DDoS attacks caused by
botnets. An example is project on Crowdsourced
Satellite Imagery, which was taken down by a botnet

DDoS attack. Risks related to DDoS botnet attacks
include limited availability and performance of the
crowdsourcing site resulting in financial and reputational
loss. Reactive controls include event monitoring of the
hosting infrastructure, rerouting unwanted Internet
traffic, continuous automated data checks, and monitoring suspicious network flow patterns. Proactive control
examples include firewalls, monitoring the history of
network flows, deploying multiple ISPs, and creating
recovery plans in case of successful attacks.

5. Discussion and conclusions
The purpose of this study was to identify emerging
risks related to disruptive and deceptive behavior in
crowdsourcing contexts. Through an extensive search
of academic and online sources, we gathered recent
examples of incidents where crowdsourcing sites were
attacked or abused. We identified the CIA element at
risk for each incident. We observed that most unique
real-life incidents were related to intentional deceptive
actions such as placement of prank information,
placement of false information, unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information or disruption of the secure
flow of information. Based on the collected incidents,
we derived an organizing framework of distinct risk
types concerning disruptive and deceptive crowdsourcing. The framework consists of two risk types for
Confidentiality issues, four risk types for Integrity
issues, and one type for Availability issues. The
framework further outlines possible controls to
mitigate the risk types in terms of preventing the risks
or containing the damage once the risks materialize.
Our findings have implications for research in
crowdsourcing deception and cybersecurity. Crowdsourcing threats appear to be predominantly related to
social engineering attacks. Descriptions of deceptive
activities dominated in our collection of incidents. This
shows a need for more in-depth research on human
factors related to the motivations and behaviors of
cybercriminals and cyber perpetrators that target
crowdsourcing. For this purpose, the framework that
we developed provides an initial outline for a
structured research program into the nature and effects
of malicious and deceptive crowdsourcing activities.
The framework can assist categorizing past research
and identifying gaps to be addressed in future studies.
Furthermore, it can be used as a starting point for
researchers theorizing about antecedents to malicious
and deceptive behavior in crowdsourcing. Furthermore,
through the future collection of crowdsourcing
incidents, the framework can help identify
commonalities between certain types of incidents in
terms of behavioral and contextual factors.
From a practical perspective, the incident examples
and organizing framework can provide guidance for
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organizations that are considering using crowdsourcing
for their business needs and for crowdsourcing
providers to assess and strengthen their control
framework to mitigate deception threats. For instance,
results indicate that risks are predominantly linked to
reputational and/or financial loss. Both Confidentiality
risk types refer to privacy violation risks that are likely
to damage a crowdsourcing platform’s reputation and
result in fines. The Integrity risk types are related to the
loss of reliability and reputation that crowdsourcing
platforms face when their sites are flooded with false
information. This will ultimately cause users to
abandon them. The Availability risk type impacts
platform performance and directly leads to loss of
profits due to the unavailability of a crowdsourcing
site. Another practical implication relates to the need
for the crowdsourcing industry to consider setting up a
mechanism through which they can (anonymously)
share cyber and deception incidents. An organized
library of incidents will support learning about
potential risks and will ultimately strengthen the
security of the industry as a whole. For instance, a
secured platform to collect crowdsourcing deception
incidents would assist businesses to learn to recognize
and avert deceptive actions.
A key limitation of our study is that we likely were
not able to collect an exhaustive set of incidents. First,
crowdsourcing is still a relatively new phenomenon so
additional risk types may emerge in the near future.
Second, organizations may be aware of the occurrence
of deceptive actions so incidents go unreported.
Finally, some organizations are likely to be reluctant in
sharing detailed information on incidents out of
competitive and reputational considerations.
Future research directions include addressing the
limitations of this study by expanding the collection of
incidents through interviews with crowdsourcing service
providers. Also, future research may focus on issues
such as the extent to which risk awareness deters
organizations from employing crowdsourcing, whether
certain tasks are more vulnerable to deception than
others, and whether crowdsourcing efforts are more
vulnerable to deception in certain cultures than others.
Finally, theoretical research could investigate the underlying cognitive mechanisms why people who aim to
deceive others online, e.g., why do people post false
information and what are the reasons for choosing crowdsourcing crowds as target victims? Such research could
be informed by criminology theories such as General
Strain Theory or Routine Activities Theory [25].
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Appendix A. Disruption and Deception Incidents in Crowdsourcing
Type & Task description

Crowd

I1. Sybil attack – people posting false
data on crowdsourced map system
Waze

Users posted false reports of a wreck,
speed trap or other blockage in their
neighborhoods to deflect some of the
traffic flow

I2. DARPA Red Balloon Challenge –
false locations of balloon placements
were submitted across teams
I2. DARPA Shredder Challenge
required participants to put shredded
documents together. Some of the
crowd workers sabotaged the
initiative by repeatedly undoing the
work delivered by other crowd
workers

False locations were submitted across
the teams

I4. Prank designs submitted to Henkel
challenge – the designs got voted to
the top ranks and consequently the
company had to retract public voting
C2. Netflix released hundred million
anonymized user records as part of its
“Netflix Prize” Contest. User records
became known after they were
combined with other information to
find the identities of the users in the
dataset
C1. Hacking attack on crowdsourcing
page to collect sensitive data incl.
passwords, phone numbers, email
addresses and credit card numbers
(Kickstarter)
I4. Mountain Dew Campaign poll was
bombarded with unusable names
proposals
C1. Crowdfunding site Patreon was
hacked for users' names, email, posts,
and shipping addresses
I2. Police officers flooding Waze app
with false information on their
activity to make the app's information
less useful to drivers

Intentionally pranked designs
confused the voting crowd

Crowdsourcing
Platform
The app detected
a saboteur only
after two weeks
of daily false
information posts

Problem
owner

Governance

Crowd
Contributions

False locations’
goal was to confuse
other participants
Inserted input
contributed to
creation of a wrong
result, long term
impact of the
attacks resulted in
decrease in
participation
Users had maliciously influenced the
vote; wrong input
was placed on site

A crowd of attackers piled up the
pieces of the jigsaw and sabotaged
genuine users’ work making it much
more complex, as they had first to
unstack the pieces and then search for
correct matches
Henkel
decided to
sort out some
suggestions
Data, when
combined
with external information disclosed user
identities
Lack of sufficient security measures
to hacking
attempt
The crowd started posting offensive
proposals in the contest for a greenapple infused soft drink name

Offensive campaign
results shut
initiative down
Site's user
database got
hacked

The crowd (police) entering fake data
on Waze app
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CIA Triad

Source

Integrity – wrong data was
put into the system to
redirect the traffic away
from the local neighborhood

[24]

Integrity – wrong data
strongly influenced the
quality of information
Integrity violation –
provided data computed
false results

[10]

Integrity – data provided
resulted in the cancellation
of the voting

[19]

Confidentiality – data
containing identities of the
contest participants was
disclosed after being
combined with publicly
accessible information

[53]

Confidentiality – Kickstarter
user data was hacked

[3]

Integrity – provided prank
data forced the organizers to
close the campaign
Confidentiality - hackers
accessed users' names, email,
posts, and shipping addresses
Integrity – false information
provided aiming to spread
disinformation

[42]

[43]

[18]
[2]
[5]

I3. Botnet attack on Waze

Two students created fake Waze
accounts to create fake traffic jams

I4. Internet polls steered off track by
the voting crowd into outrageous
results
I3. Robo-voting that skewed public
polls, e.g. Time 100 Most Influential
People

E.g. prank responses on polls related to
naming ships, bridges, products, planets
or voting for concert spots for musicians
Polls sabotaged by
automated scripts
(bots) that submitted multiple votes
PopVote hosted by
Amazon Web
Services, Cloudflare and
UDomain. All
hosting services hit
by large scale
DDoS attacks
Site sourcing
images of sensitive geographical
sites taken down
by a DDoS attack
The website was
hit with DDoS
attack

A1. DDoS attack on PopVote, Hong
Kong Democracy voting website in
June 2014

A1. Project on Crowdsourced
Satellite Imagery taken down by
DDoS attack
A1. Reddit site became unavailable
because of DDoS attacks
I2. Failed hunt for the Boston Bomber

After Boston bombing attack, the
crowd attempted and failed to
accurately identify the offenders

I2. SketchFactor application
crowdsourced crime and public safety
reporting perceptions, not facts

C2. PatientsLikeMe users’ personal
data on taken medications and illness
symptoms was gathered by Nielsen

Wrong information
on suspects on
Reddit and Twitter
resulted in crowd
searching for
innocent people
Platform for users
to browse reports
of “sketchy”
behavior and
crowdsource their
own stories was
accused of racism
and profiling

Nielsen opened personal accounts on
the app and copied personal data from
chatrooms and on bulletin boards.
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Integrity – false information
provided aiming to spread
disinformation
Integrity – prank poll
responses aiming to spread
disinformation
Integrity – voting results
were skewed

[47]

Availability – the goal was
to take the website down

[37]

Availability – the website
stopped working

[36]

Availability - Reddit site
experienced an outage

[28]

Integrity – wrong input data
created wrong output and
resulted for the chase of
innocent people

[9]

Integrity - the data available
on SketchFactor compared
with actual crime data
revealed few clear overlaps

[13]

Confidentiality – although
there was no privacy violation, Nielsen found a way to
extract app’s users’ data

[15]

[40]
[41]
[30]

